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NOTES
THE 1978 BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT'S POLICE OR
REGULATORY POWER EXEMPTION TO THE
AUTOMATIC STAY: UNNECESSARY, UNFOUNDED, AND
UNRESTRAINED
"[A] stay of creditors from collecting their claims against the
debtor and his property from and after the filing of a petition
under the Bankruptcy Act is indispensable to bankruptcy adminis-
tration."' Today, the automatic stay continues to be "one of the
fundamental debtor protections provided by the bankruptcy laws.
It gives a debtor a breathing spell from his creditors... [and] also
provides creditor protection."2 Although historically the automatic
stay was a common law doctrine, federal bankruptcy legislation has
codified a broad automatic stay provision.3 Congress intended the
stay to have wide application, but the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978 includes specific exemption provisions. Under these exemp-
tions, certain claimants can continue to pursue their claims against
the debtor unless the court specifically grants the debtor's motion
for relief. Exemptions from the automatic stay include actions re-
lating to governmental exercise of police or regulatory power and
enforcement of judgments other than money judgments on behalf
of governmental units.4 The exemptions are powerful tools in the
1. Kennedy, Automatic Stays Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. MICH. JL. REF. 1, 3
(1978) (citing Meuller v. Nugent, 184 U.S. 1, 14 (1901)).
2. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 340, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6296-97 [hereinafter HouSE REPORT].
3. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
4. The exemptions are codified as part of the automatic stay provision at 11 U.S.C. §
362(b)(1)-(10). Sections 362(a)(1)-(2) and (b)(4)-(5) provide:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition filed under
section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or an application filed under section
5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C.
78eee(a)(3)), operates as a stay, applicable to all entities, of-
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or employ-
ment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action or proceeding
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hands of local and state governments, allowing them to pursue
their enforcement actions against debtors and ignore bankruptcy
proceedings. 5 The exemptions fail to strike a balance between the
traditional goal of protecting troubled debtors and the desire to
prevent harm to the public by those debtors.
Although Congress intended the exemptions to the stay to have
narrow application,6 all types of governmental units have litigated
exemptions 7 in a variety of contexts,8 seeking to have their claims
satisfied prior to those of private creditors. Courts have been una-
ble to develop a single rule for determining when governmental
units qualify for the exemptions from the automatic stay. Various
courts interpreting the same statute and legislative history have
arrived at astonishingly divergent applications of the law.'
against the debtor that was or could have been commenced before the com-
mencement of the case under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor
that arises before the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the estate, of a
judgment obtained before the commencement of the case under this title;
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title.... does
not operate as a stay-
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or continu-
ation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such gov-
ernmental unit's police or regulatory power;
(5) under subsection (a)(2) of this section, of the enforcement of a judgment,
other than a money judgment, obtained in an action or proceeding by a gov-
ernmental unit to enforce such governmental unit's police or regulatory power.
Id.
5. Although the government could obtain judicial relief from the stay imposed by com-
mon law, and the Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure permitted ex parte relief, see infra note
45 and accompanying text, Congress was concerned that the stay interfered with govern-
ment attempts to stop pollution and fraud. See infra note 68 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 69.
7. See In re Fintel, 10 Bankr. 50 (Bankr. D. Or. 1981) (state Builders Board); In re Joe
DeLisi Fruit Co., 11 Bankr. 694 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981) (state Department of Agriculture);
Aherns Aircraft, Inc. v. NLRB, 703 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1983) (National Labor Relations
Board); Civil Aeronautics Bd. v. Tour Travel Enterprises, 440 F. Supp. 1265 (N.D. Ill. 1977)
(Civil Aeronautics Board).
8. See In re Cousins Restaurants, Inc., 11 Bankr. 521 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1981) (zoning
ordinance); In re Arnage, Inc., 33 Bankr. 662 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983) (liquor license).
9. Compare NLRB v. Evans Plumbing Co., 639 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1981) (NLRB enforce-
ment proceeding ordering a bankrupt employer to reinstate two employees with back pay
fell within the statutory exemption to the automatic stay) with In re Theobald Indus., 16
AUTOMATIC STAY
In an article published soon after the United States Congress
passed the 1978 Act, Professor Kennedy,'0 who generally supports
governmental exemptions to the automatic stay,"" warned that "it
is entirely conceivable that enforcement during the interim before
judicial relief can be obtained will be fatal to the hope of financial
rehabilitation of a debtor.' 2 Despite Professor Kennedy's warning,
the governmental exemptions, intended to be applied in excep-
tional circumstances, have become common avenues for creditors
to seek payment from financially troubled debtors.
This Note first analyzes some of the policies supporting the gov-
ernmental exemptions to the automatic stay by examining the
common law, early statutory provisions, and the Bankruptcy Rules
of Procedure. The Note then examines the stay codified in the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and the section 362(b)(4) police
power exemption. The Note concludes that the police power ex-
emption codified in the 1978 Act has disrupted the courts' quest to
provide debtors a breathing spell and assure creditors orderly and
equitable proceedings.
EVOLUTION OF THE STAY: BROADENING SCOPE AND CREATING
UNIFORMITY
The Common Law
Under the common law, protection of debtors and orderly reso-
lution of creditors' claims were the primary concerns of bank-
ruptcy administration. The automatic stay played a significant role
in bankruptcy proceedings. Although the first comprehensive fed-
eral bankruptcy act in 1898's did not contain an automatic stay
provision, the courts continued to enforce adherence to the com-
Bankr. 537 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981) (unfair labor practice proceeding before NLRB in which
board sought monetary claims was subject to automatic stay).
10. Professor Kennedy served as staff director of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States. See 124 CONG. REc. 33,990 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini recogniz-
ing Professor Kennedy's service as staff director of the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of
the United States).
11. "The provision of the new legislation allowing governmental authorities to enforce
laws of a police nature without constraint by the stay is ... a reasonable resolution of the
conflicting policies involved." Kennedy, supra note 1, at 64.
12. Id.
13. Act of July 1, 1898, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
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mon law automatic stay. In 1901 Chief Justice Fuller of the United
States Supreme Court wrote: "It is as true of the present law as it
was of that of 1867, that the filing of the petition is a caveat to all
the world, and in effect an attachment and injunction. . .,4
Congress first codified automatic stays as part of farm debtor
relief legislation passed during the Depression era. These first stay
provisions were extremely narrow. The 1933 amendment 5 to the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 included an automatic stay provision that,
upon a farmer's filing of a petition of bankruptcy, stayed proceed-
ings for recovery of debts, foreclosure of mortgages, tax sales, and
similar actions unless a judge granted the creditor relief from the
stay.' 6 Along with this relief provision, the first automatic stay pro-
vision also contained an exemption provision.17 The stay did not
apply to tax collection or to any proceedings affecting property
other than farm equipment or the household effects of the farmer's
family. As originally codified, the statutory stay was a limited ac-
14. Mueller v. Nugent, 184 U.S. 1, 14 (1901) (citing Bank v. Sherman, 101 U.S. 403
(1879)).
15. Act of Mar. 3, 1933, § 75(o), 47 Stat. 1467, 1473. Section 75(o) provided:
Except upon petition made to and granted by the judge after hearing and
report by the conciliation commissioner, the following proceedings shall not be
instituted, or if instituted at any time prior to the filing of a petition under this
section, shall not be maintained, in any court or otherwise, against the farmer
or his property, at any time after the filing of the petition under this section,
and prior to the confirmation or other disposition of the composition or exten-
sion proposal by the court:
(1) Proceedings for any demand, debt, or account, including any money
demand;
(2) Proceedings for foreclosure of a mortgage on land, or for cancellation,
rescission, or specific performance of an agreement for sale of land or for recov-
ery of possession of land;
(3) Proceedings to acquire title to land by virtue of any tax sale;
(4) Proceedings by way of execution, attachment, or garnishment;
(5) Proceedings to sell land under or in satisfaction of any judgment or
mechanic's lien; and
(6) Seizure, distress, sale, or other proceedings under an execution or under




17. "The prohibitions of subdivision (o) shall not apply to proceedings for the collection
of taxes, or interest or penalties with respect thereto, nor to proceedings affecting solely
property other than that used in farming operations or comprising the home or household
effects of the farmer or his family." Id. § 75(p), 47 Stat. at 1473.
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tion intended only to protect the essentials of farm operation.
Other common law stays continued to be applied, however.
In 1934, Congress amended the stay provision"8 to permit a
bankrupt farmer alternative options to retain possession of mort-
gaged property with or without the consent of the mortgagee.
Under the first option, the debtor purchased his estate for an ap-
praised value and made deferred payments over a period of five
years. The balance of the appraised price was due the sixth year.19
If the mortgagee refused to assent, the bankruptcy court would
"stay all proceedings for a period of five years, during which five
years the debtor shall retain possession of all or any part of his
property. ' '20 The second arrangement was a five-year stay of all
proceedings by a secured creditor against a farmer-debtor's prop-
erty.2" In 1935, however, the Supreme Court in Louisville Stock
Land Bank v. Radford22 held the amended stay provision unconsti-
tutional under the fifth amendment.
In Radford, the defendant, in addition to requesting a judgment
of bankruptcy, requested that his property be appraised and that
he be granted the relief provided by the amended stay provision.23
His mortgagee responded with a suit challenging the constitution-
ality of the automatic stay. Justice Brandeis, delivering the opinion
of the Court, held that the stay provision authorized the uncom-
pensated taking of specific property rights of substantial value and
therefore violated the fifth amendment.24 Justice Brandeis
concluded:
If the public interest requires, and permits, the taking of prop-
erty of individual mortgagees in order to relieve the necessities
of individual mortgagors, resort must be had to proceedings by
eminent domain; so that, through taxation, the burden of the
18. Act of June 28, 1934, 48 Stat. 1289.
19. Id. at 1290.
20. Id. at 1291.
21. See Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MICH. JL. REF. 175, 180
(1977).
22. 295 U.S. 555 (1935).
23. Id. at 575.
24. Id. at 601-02.
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relief afforded in the public interest may be borne by the
public. 25
Three months later,26 Congress responded with an amendment
to the Bankruptcy Act which included a new version of the auto-
matic stay. The amendment reduced the period of the stay from
five to three years and permitted the court, in its discretion, to
order the sale of certain property of the debtor and accelerate the
debtor's payments.28 The new provision withstood challenges on
constitutional grounds in 193729 and in 1940.30
Codifying a Broader Stay
In 1938 Congress enacted the Chandler Act,31 which "radically
amended 3 2 the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. The Chandler Act codi-
fied three statutory stays in Chapters 10 and 12 of the Bankruptcy
Act. Chapter 10, the corporate reorganizations chapter, contained a
section that, upon a court order approving a reorganization peti-
tion automatically stayed a prior pending bankruptcy, mortgage
foreclosure, equity receivership proceeding, or action to enforce a
25. Id. at 602.
26. Kennedy, supra note 21, at 180.
27. Act of Aug. 28, 1935, § 6, 49 Stat. 942, 943. The 1935 amendment also amended the
exemption provision, § 75(p), to remove the previous exemptions and substantially broaden
the scope of the stay. The amended exemption provision provided:
The prohibitions of subsection (o) shall apply to all judicial or official pro-
ceedings in any court or under the direction of any official, and shall apply to
all creditors, public or private, and to all of the debtor's property wherever
located. All such property shall be under the sole jurisdiction and control of
the court in bankruptcy, and subject to the payment of the debtor farmer's
creditors, as provided for in section 75 of this Act.
Id. § 5, 49 Stat. at 943.
28. Id., 49 Stat. at 944.
29. See Wright v. Mountain Trust Bank, 300 U.S. 440 (1937) (amended Act not unconsti-
tutional as applied to a mortgage because possession of the property during the Stay of
Foreclosure is in the debtor subject to the obligations imposed by the Act and under the
supervision and control of the court, rather than in a receiver or trustee).
30. See Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940) (the Act was within the plenary power of
Congress in respect of the subject of bankruptcy).
31. Act of June 22, 1938, 52 Stat. 840.
32. In re Hillsdale Foundry Co., 2 Collier Bankr. Cas. (MB) 542, 547 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1974).
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lien." Chapter 12, which dealt with real property arrangements by
natural persons, contained two stay sections. Section 428 stayed
any action to enforce a lien on the real property or real chattel of
the debtor,3 4 and section 507 stayed a prior mortgage foreclosure,
equity, or other proceeding in federal or state court in which a
trustee or receiver had been appointed. 5 These three statutory
stays "anticipated the stays of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
by more than 30 years."38
Expansion and Unification: The Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure
In 1964 Congress authorized the Supreme Court to "prescribe by
general rules... the practice and procedure under the Bankruptcy
Act."3  From 1973 to 1975 the Supreme Court adopted Bankruptcy
Rules of Procedure that introduced automatic stay provisions
throughout the Bankruptcy Code.3 8 The Bankruptcy Rules of Pro-
33. Act of June 22, 1938, 52 Stat. 840, 888. Chapter 10, § 148 provides, "Until otherwise
ordered by the judge, an order approving a petition shall operate as a stay of a prior pend-
ing bankruptcy, mortgage foreclosure, or equity receivership proceeding, and of any act or
other proceeding to enforce a lien against the debtor's property."
34. Id., 52 Stat. at 918. Chapter 10, § 428 states:
Unless and until otherwise ordered by the court, upon hearing and after notice
the to debtor and 011 other parties in interest, the filing of a petition under this
chapter shall operate as a stay of any act or proceeding to enforce any lien
upon the real property or chattel real of a debtor.
35. Id., 52 Stat. at 927. Chapter 12, §§ 506-507 provide:
A petition may be filed under this chapter notwithstanding the pedency of a
prior mortgage foreclosure, equity, or other proceeding in a court of the United
States or of any State in which a receiver or trustee of all or any part of the
property of a debtor has been appointed or for whose appointment an applica-
tion has been made.
Such prior proceeding shall be stayed by the filing of a petition under this
chapter. The trustee appointed under this chapter, upon his qualification, or, if
a debtor is continued in possession, the debtor, shall become vested with the
rights, if any, of such prior receiver or trustee in such property and with the
right to the immediate possession thereof. The trustee or debtor in possession
shall also have the right to immediate possession of all real property and chat-
tels real of the debtor in the possession of a trustee under a trust deed or a
mortgagee under a mortgage.
Id.
36. Kennedy, supra note 21, at 182.
37. Act of Oct. 3, 1964, 78 Stat. 1001 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1982)).
38. On April 24, 1973, the Court adopted the Chapter 1 through 7 and Chapter 13 rules,
which included rules 401, 601, and 13-401. 411 U.S. 989 (1973). Rule 401 provided that the
filing of a petition operated as an automatic stay of certain actions on unsecured debts. Id.
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cedure represented a significant change from the Bankruptcy Act's
limited automatic stay provisions. The rules broadened the reach
of the stay, made it effective upon the filing of the petition for
relief, and shifted the burden to the creditor, who had to show
cause to obtain relief from the stay.39 Suddenly, the stay became
an obstacle to government enforcement actions; it barred the fed-
eral government from collecting a debtor's past due federal income
tax,4 prevented a municipality from cutting off a debtor's water
supply,41 stopped a municipal board from revoking a debtor's li-
quor license,42 and prevented automatic revocation of a hospital's
license.43
at 1048. Rule 601 instructed that the filing of a petition operated as an automatic stay
against lien enforcement. Id. at 1062. Under rule 13-401 a petition filed under Chapter 13
operated as an automatic stay of actions against the debtor or lien enforcement. Id. at 1177.
The Court adopted Chapter 11 rules, including rule 11-44, on March 18, 1974. 415 U.S.
1003, 1033 (1974). Rule 11-44 provided that a petition filed under Chapter 11 operated as a
general automatic stay against any actions against the debtor or proceedings to enforce any
lien. Id. at 1033.
The Court adopted Chapter 10 and 12 rules on April 28, 1975. 421 U.S. 1019 (1975).
Under rule 10-601, a petition filed under Chapter 10 operated as an automatic stay of ac-
tions against the debtor and lien enforcement. Id. at 1069. Similarly, rule 12-43 provided
that petitions filed under Chapter 12 operated as a stay of proceedings against the debtor or
any actions to enforce a lien against his property. Id. at 1116.
39. Norton's Bankruptcy Law and Practice describes the impact of Bankruptcy Rules
401, 601, 10-601, 11-44, 12-43, and 13-401:
The adoption of the Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure resulted in a significant
policy change in the Bankruptcy Act's automatic stay provisions. The auto-
matic stay formerly available only under Chapter 10 became a hallmark of all
straight bankruptcy cases and all other chapter cases as well. The debtor in
possession no longer needed to make application to restrain the commence-
ment or continuation of any action or to enforce any lien against the debtor or
its property. The stay became effective immediately upon the filing of the peti-
tion for relief. The burden was shifted to the creditor who sought to obtain
relief from the stay to file a complaint in an adversary proceeding upon a
showing of cause. If the trustee or debtor in possession sought continuation of
the stay against lien enforcement, as distinguished from actions against or the
enforcement of judgments against the debtor, the trustee or debtor in posses-
sion then had the burden of showing entitlement to the stay.
1 W. NORTON, BANKRUPTcY LAW AND PRACTICE § 20.02, at 4-5 (1986) (footnotes omitted).
40. Verran v. United States (In re Verran), 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. (MB) 288 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1977), vacated and remanded, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 47 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
41. Shenberg v. Carpentersville (In re Shenberg), 433 F. Supp. 677 (N.D. Ill., 1977).
42. Katman v. New Jersey (In re Angelo Priest, Inc.), 13 Collier Bankr. Cas. (MB) 524
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1977).
43. In re Saugus General Hosp., 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR) 1160 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1979).
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Relief from the Stay
Under each of the Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure imposing a
stay, creditors could obtain relief from the stay through an adver-
sary proceeding initiated by filing a complaint with the court."
The rules also included procedures for obtaining ex parte relief
from the stay in situations in which "immediate and irreparable
injury, loss, or damage will result to the plaintiff before the adverse
party or his attorney can be heard in opposition. ' '45 Furthermore,
each of the automatic stay rules contained a clause explaining that
the rule did not preclude the issuance of other relief.46 In sum, the
stay provisions were automatic in that they became effective upon
the debtor's filing of a petition. The automatic stay provisions re-
flected the common law concern for debtor protection. They were
not, however, impermeable.
Although the rules contained provisions for relief, some courts
relieved creditors of the stay by expanding the exemptions rather
44. See, e.g., rule 10-601(c), 421 U.S. at 1069.
On the filing of a complaint seeking relief from a stay provided by this rule,
the bankruptcy court shall, subject to the provisions of subdivision (d) of this
rule, [ex parte relief provision] set the trial for the earliest possible date, and it
shall take precedence over all matters except older matters of the same charac-
ter. The court may, for cause shown, terminate, annul, modify, or condition
such stay. A party seeking continuation of a stay against lien enforcement shall
show that he is entitled thereto.
Id. at 1069-70.
45. Rule 601(d)(1), 411 U.S. at 1063. Rules 8-501(d)(1), 10-601(d)(1), 11-44(e)(1), 12-
43(e)(1), and 13-3401(e)(1) also authorized ex parte relief from the stay on a showing by
sworn allegations that "immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the
plaintiff" before a hearing could be held. See Kennedy, supra note 21, at 226 & n.250.
46. See, e.g., rule 10-601(3), 421 U.S. at 1070. "Nothing in this rule precludes the issuance
of, or relief from, any stay, restraining order, or injunction when otherwise authorized." Id.
The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1982), and § 105 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §
105 (Supp. III 1985), which defines the power of the bankruptcy court, also provided proce-
dures for courts to grant creditors relief from the stay.
According to the All Writs Act, "[t]he Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of
Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictios
and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1982). See E.E.O.C.
v. Rath Packing Co., 787 F.2d 318, 325 (8th Cir. 1986). Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code
estasblished that bankruptcy courts have the power to "issue any order, process, or judg-
ment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of [title 11, Bankruptcy]."
11 U.S.C. § 105(a). See Rath, 787 F.2d at 325.
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than requiring parties to request relief.47 For example, in Colonial
Tavern, Inc. v. Byrne,45 the United States district Court for the
District of Massachusetts chose to create an exemption to the au-
tomatic stay rather than require the government to adhere to the
prescribed procedures for obtaining relief. The court held that rule
11-44 did not operate to stay a license suspension proceeding in
particular and any local regulatory law in general.49 Citing general
principles of bankruptcy law,50 the court circumvented the imme-
diate question of the proper procedure for contesting a stay under
the rules and rendered a result-oriented decision. The court's
choice to discard procedure not only removed the debtor's protec-
tion, but also showed disdain for the Bankruptcy Rules.
Some bankruptcy courts held their ground, however, and did not
allow government agencies to circumvent the Bankruptcy Rules.
For example, in Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan,5' the United
States Bankruptcy Court for the Western District of Michigan up-
held the rule 11-44 stay where the state sought summary judgment
rather than relief from the stay. In Hillsdale Foundry, the debtor
sought a temporary restraining order against the state restraining
it from commencing or continuing a pollution enforcement action
against the company. The state responded by filing a motion for
summary judgment rather than applying for relief from the stay.2
The bankruptcy court held that the rule 11-44 stay was in effect
and an additional restraining order was not necessary to enjoin the
state's enforcement action.53 Consequently, the state's choice to
contest the application of the stay rather than apply for relief had
a significant impact on the result.5 4
47. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Jonas (In re Bel Air Chateau Hosp., Inc.) 611 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir.
1979) (NLRB proceeding exempt from rule 11-44 stay).
48. (In re Colonial Tavern), 420 F. Supp. 44 (D. Mass. 1976).
49. Id. at 45.
50. Id. (citing Bay Bridge Inn, 94 F.2d 555, 557 (2d Cir. 1938) (A. Hand, J.)).
51. 2 Collier Bankr. Cas. (MB) 542 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1974). See infra notes 74-84 and
accompanying text.
52. Id. at 543.
53. Id. at 551-52.
54. Id. at 550. "The Rules provide procedures by which relief from a stay may be granted.
No such relief has been applied for by the defendants." Id.
864 [Vol. 29:855
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ABANDONING THE COMMON LAW: THE AUTOMATIC STAY IN THE
BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT OF 1978
The Stay: Scope, Relief Provisions, and Exemptions
In 1978 Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act. Section
362(a) of the Act imposes, upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition,
an automatic stay on eight different types of proceedings against
the debtor.5 Among the automatic stay provisions are subsection
(a)(1), which imposes a stay on the commencement or continuation
of pre-petition proceedings-judicial or other proceedings against
the debtor that were or could have been commenced prior to the
filing of the bankruptcy petition-, and subsection (a)(2), which
stays the enforcement of a pre-petition judgment against the
debtor. Together, the eight subsections create a comprehensive
stay that reflects the common law doctrine of debtor protection.
Under subsection 362(d), the general relief provision, a party
may obtain relief from a stay either for cause56 or if the debtor
lacks equity in property unnecessary to an effective reorganiza-
tion.57 Subsection 362(f), the ex parte relief provision, authorizes
the court to grant relief from the stay without a hearing whenever
necessary to "prevent irreparable damage to the interest of an en-
tity in property, if such interest will suffer such damage before
there is an opportunity for notice and a hearing .... ," The relief
provisions follow the protective spirit of the common law by plac-
ing the burden on the creditor, and the provisions serve to protect
creditors who may be faced with exceptional circumstances.
55. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)-(8) (1982 & Supp. 1I 1985).
56. Id. § 362(d)(1). "Cause includes lack of adequate protection of an interest in property
which may result from a diminution in value due to depreciation or to physical loss or dam-
age." 1 W. NORTON, supra note 39, § 20.26, at 45. See California v. Farmers Markets, Inc.
(In re Farmers Markets, Inc.), 792 F.2d 1400, 1404 (9th Cir. 1986).
57. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (d)(2).
58. Id. § 362(f) (Supp. 1m 1985). Subsection 362(e) provides that a request for relief shall
receive an expedited hearing. If the court does not rule within 30 days from the time a party
in interest requests relief from the stay, the stay is automatically terminated as to the re-
questing party. Id. § 362(e) (1982 & Supp. HI 1985). For any hearing under subsections (d)
or (e), subsection (g) provides that the party requesting relief has the burden of proof on the
issue of the debtor's equity in property, id. § 362(g)(1) (1982), and the debtor, or "party
opposing such relief," has the burden of proof on all other issues. Id. § 362(g)(2).
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Although the relief provisions provide adequate protection for
most creditors, the 1978 Act continues the trend of eroding debtor
protection through enumerated exemptions to the stay. Section
362(b) specifies ten complete exemptions from the stay." Among
these exemptions are subsection (b)(4), which exempts "com-
mencement or continuation" of governmental actions to enforce
police or regulatory power,6 0 and subsection (b)(5), which permits
courts to enforce judgments, other than money judgments, on be-
half of governmental units exercising police or regulatory power.0 1
Lacking a definition of "police or regulatory power," the lan-
guage of subsection (b)(4) provides courts little more than a start-
ing point for their analysis. Few courts that have considered cases
involving attempts by governmental units to enforce police or reg-
ulatory powers against parties seeking bankruptcy adjudication
have been able to restrict their analysis to statutory language
alone. 2 When unable to determine the applicability of a statute,
most courts look to the "intent of the legislature."' s Thus, most
bankruptcy courts seeking to divine legislative intent behind sub-
section 362(b)(4) have looked exclusively to the legislative history
of the 1978 Act. 4
59. Id. § 362(b)(1)-(10) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
60. Id. § 362(b)(4) (1982).
61. Id. § 362(b)(5).
62. In N.L.R.B. v. Jonas (In re Bel Air Chateau Hosp., Inc.), 611 F.2d 1248 (9th Cir.
1979), a transition case decided under pre-existing bankruptcy law, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that an unfair labor practices action brought by the
N.L.R.B. was exempt from the rule 11-44 stay. In dicta, the court considered the language of
§ 362(b)(4) and suggested that its holding was harmonious with the new law. "Section 362
thus makes explicit the principles of the old bankruptcy law: stays of regulatory proceedings
should not be automatic but are appropriate when it is likely that the court proceedings will
threaten the estate's assets." Id. at 1251. Although the Ninth Circuit discounted its conclu-
sions by declining to "express any views on whether [N.L.R.B.] proceedings fall within the
scope of § 362(b)(4)," id. at 1251 n.1, subsequent decisions have credited the court's dicta
with undue authority. See N.L.R.B. v. Evans Plumbing Co., 639 F.2d 291, 293 n.2 (5th Cir.
1981).
63. 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND: STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.05 at 20-21 (4th ed. 1984).
"An overwhelming majority of judicial opinions considering statutory issues are written in
the context of legislative intent." Id.
64. In at least one case the court referred to Black's Law Dictionary as well as legislative
history to determine the meaning of "police power" in subsection 362(b)(4). See Herr v.




The courts have focused on three distinct discussions of the au-
tomatic stay that pertain to Congress' intent in exacting the
362(b)(4) exemption to the stay. Although some courts have re-
ferred to these passages together, as if to suggest that they were
harmonious, 5 the statements are internally conflicting. A court's
choice of which of these legislative pronouncements apply and how
to interpret it, bears significantly on the outcome of the court's
analysis.
In its report on the bill, the House Judiciary Committee found
that the stay provisions in the previous Bankruptcy Act were inad-
equate from the standpoint of both the debtor and the creditor.66
The committee explained that under the law then in effect, the
stay had been overused in the area of government regulation:
For example, in one Texas bankruptcy court, the stay was ap-
plied to prevent the State of Maine from closing down one of
the debtor's plants that was polluting a Maine river in violation
of Maine's environmental protection laws. In a Montana case,
the stay was applied to prevent Nevada from obtaining an in-
junction against a principal in a corporation who was acting in
violation of Nevada's anti-fraud consumer protection laws. The
bill excepts these kinds of actions from the automatic stay. The
States will be able to enforce their police and regulatory powers
free from the automatic stay. 7
This statement is an essential part of the argument of debtors who
claim that the legislature intended to limit the scope of the exemp-
tion to situations of pollution and fraud.""
Similar to the committee's statements on pollution and fraud,
floor statements by the committeemen in charge of the bill for
65. See Missouri v. United States Bankruptcy Court, 647 F.2d 768, 775-76 (8th Cir. 1981).
66. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 174, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWs at 6135.
67. Id. at 174-75, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 6135-36. Although this passage
in the legislative history may suggest rampant abuse of the stay by purveyors of fraud as
well as polluters, very few such fraud cases are reported. For an example of a case decided
under pre-1978 law in which the court held that a state regulatory proceeding enforcing a
consumer fraud act was not subject to the rule 11-44 stay, see Dixon v. Grand Spalding
Dodge, Inc. (In re Grand Spaulding Dodge), 5 Bankr. 481 (N.D. III. 1980).
68. See infra notes 90-100 and accompanying text.
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both the Senate and the House of Representatives suggest a lim-
ited exemption:
This [governmental exemption] section is intended to be given a
narrow construction in order to permit governmental units to
pursue actions to protect the public health and safety and not to
protect a pecuniary interest in property of the debtor or prop-
erty of the estate."
Additional commentary in the legislative history, however, sug-
gests that the governmental exemptions were intended to reach be-
yond pollution and fraud situations. Both the Senate Judiciary
Committee Report and the House Judiciary Committee Report ac-
companying the bill indicate that the police power exemption cov-
ers proceedings in which a governmental unit is suing a debtor to
prevent or stop violation of fraud, environmental protection, con-
sumer protection, safety, or similar police or regulatory laws. 0
THE 362(b)(4) EXEMPTION: UNNECESSARY, UNFOUNDED, AND
UNRESTRAINED
An Unnecessary Exemption
Situations requiring exemptions as opposed to relief from the
stay are rare. The relief provisions of the Bankruptcy Rules of Pro-
69. 124 CONG. REc. 32, 395 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); id. at 33,995 (statement
of Sen. DeConcini). Sands suggests that the statements of committeemen should be ac-
corded equal weight with other forms of legislative history:
Courts have... excepted the statements of the members of the committee
during the course of floor debate from the general rule excluding or restricting
the use of statements by individual legislators about the meaning of the bill in
debate. His [the committeeman in charge] remarks upon presenting the bill to
the house ... will be considered by the courts in construing provisions of the
bill subsequently enacted into law. These statements are regarded as being like
supplemental committee reports and are accorded the same weight as formal
committee reports.
The courts have adopted the same attitude toward statements of the mem-
ber of the conference committee who explains to the house the action his com-
mittee has taken in compromises made with the other house of the legislature.
C. SANDS, supra note 63, § 48.14, at 334-35 (footnotes omitted). See Commonwealth Oil Ref.
Co. v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 805 F.2d 1175, 1184 n.7 (5th Cir. 1986).
70. HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 343, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmiN.
NEWS at 6135; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADmN. NEWS 5787, 5838 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT].
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cedure include even ex parte procedures that conceivably could be
performed by a telephone call. Courts willing to exercise their dis-
cretionary power to stay proceedings or grant creditors relief from
the stay should be able to handle cases within the policy con-
straints in almost every circumstance presented. Courts neverthe-
less have permitted the growth of unneeded exemptions. By failing
to utilize the procedures available in the Bankruptcy Act, the
courts have forced a loophole through which a governmental unit
can drive a mere zoning ordinance.
A fire chief should not be required to petition the court for relief
before ordering a debtor to remove dynamite from atop a furnace
in the basement of a schoolhouse.7 1 On the other hand, a town gov-
ernment that has failed to enforce a zoning ordinance for twenty-
five years should not be able to use section 362(b)(4) to enforce
that ordinance against a protected debtor. 2 A governmental unit
should be exempt from the stay when emergency circumstances
render relief procedures too cumbersome-when it appears that
immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result if a
police or regulatory action is stayed.73 The common law and com-
mon sense application of the Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure pro-
vides a framework of relief and exemption provisions within which
the law can achieve this goal. The governmental enforcement ex-
emption in the 1978 Act, however, hits wide of the mark.
The Hillsdale Foundry Myth
Congress's primary motivation in creating the police power ex-
emption seems to have been to prevent debtors from hiding behind
the shield of the stay while polluting the environment or perpetrat-
71. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep't of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S. 494, 515
(1986) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying notes 94-96.
72. See Cournoyer v. Town of Lincoln, 790 F.2d 971 (1st Cir. 1986). See also infra text
accompanying notes 121-26.
73. Other commentators have discussed similar standards. See Loo, Limits of Enforcing
Governmental Powers During Bankruptcy Proceedings, 19 HARv. B.J. 103, 111 (1985);
Emerson, Governmental Actions Under the Section 362(b)(4) Bankruptcy Exemption; Of
Police Powers and Pecuniary Interests, 90 CoM. L.J. 101, 1985). The standard for this ap-
proach is an urgent threat to public health and welfare. Loo, supra. Loo, however, dispenses
with the approach as having "limited utility." Id. at 112. Emerson discards this approach in
selecting his preference, the "agency expertise" approach. Emerson, supra, at 99-100. For a
brief description of the agency expertise approach, see infra note 126.
1988]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
ing fraud. This interpretation is based on the House Judiciary
Committee report, which cited an unreported pollution case in
Maine and an equally obscure antifraud case in Montana.74 Em-
bedded in that bit of legislative history is a footnote noting that in
at least one pollution case, Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan,7 5
the court's decision to enforce the stay against state environmental
authorities was appropriate.76
In Hillsdale Foundry, the debtor had attempted various mea-
sures of control to comply with state air quality standards but with
no success. At the time it filed for bankruptcy, the foundry was
using a wet scrubber system that was unsatisfactory to the state.
When the foundry filed for a reorganization under chapter 11 of
the Bankruptcy Act, it also sought a temporary restraining order
enjoining the attorney general from commencing or continuing ac-
tion against the debtor for violation of state air quality
standards.
Judge Nims, Bankruptcy Judge in the United State District
Court for the Western District of Michigan, weighed the facts. On
the government's side, he found that the debtor was polluting the
air in violation of Michigan clean air laws. Several factors, how-
ever, weighed against allowing the state to shut down the foundry.
The foundry had formulated a pollution control plan to resolve the
pollution problem; under the guidance of a trustee and a new air
pollution control specialist, the debtor was operating at a profit.7 8
In the midst of a severe economic depression that had struck the
state, the foundry employed approximately 80 people and had an
average weekly payroll of $15,000.00. 9 The foundry's primary cus-
tomer, General Motors, would take its business elsewhere if the
debtor were forced to cease operations, and the Hillsdale plant
74. See supra text accompanying note 67.
75. (In re Hillsdale Foundry Co), 2 Collier Bankr. Cas. (MB) 542 (Bankr. W.D. Mich.
1974).
76. HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 174-75 n.4, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6135. The footnote reads: "But see In re Hillsdale Foundry Company. 1
Bankr. Ct. Dec. 195 (1974), in which the court fashioned a breathing-spell for the debtor but
let it be know that a plan could not be confirmed absent compliance with anti-pollution
laws."
77. Hillsdale Foundry Co., 2 Collier Bankr. Cas. (MB) at 543-544.
78. Id. at 545-46.
79. Id. at 544.
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probably would never reopen. The judge concluded that the facts
favored the debtor and held that rule 11-44 stayed the state's en-
forcement actions.80
Probably because the other two cases mentioned in the legisla-
tive history are not reported, courts and commentators cite Hills-
dale Foundry as the pollution case that prompted the legislature
to act. A closer look reveals that this interpretation is incorrect.
Contrary to the popular sentiment, Congress approved the court's
action in Hillsdale Foundry. That approval suggests that two pop-
ular myths are unfounded: first, that Congress intended the police
power exemption to apply automatically to all pollution cases,8 '
and second, that Congress did not respect the judgment of local
bankruptcy judges and intended the police power exemption to de-
prive them of their power to exercise judicial discretion.
Despite its absurdity, the Hillsdale Foundry myth prevails. For
example, in Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department
of Environmental Protection,82 Justice Powell, citing Hillsdale
Foundry, reviewed the history of the section 362 automatic stay
and stated: "Between 1973 and 1978, some courts had stretched
the expanded automatic stay to foreclose States' efforts to enforce
their antipollution laws, and Congress wanted to overrule these in-
terpretations since its 1978 revision."8 3 Also relying on Hillsdale
Foundry, Professor Kennedy wrote: "Clearly, the purpose of [the
governmental exemptions] is to overrule decisions applying the au-
tomatic stay to proceedings to enforce state environmental control
laws.18 4
80. Id. at 542. The judge also considered the fact that the state was attempting to bypass
the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and had not actually sought relief from the automatic
stay. Id. See supra note 54 and accompanying text for a discussion of relief from the stay.
81. Hazardous waste cleanup has provided commentators with an enthralling context for
analysis of the Bankruptcy Code. See Note, The Bankruptcy Code and Hazardous Waste
Cleanup: An Examination of the Policy Conflict, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 165 (1985).
82. 474 U.S. 494 (1986). See infra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
83. Id. at 504 & n.6 (footnote omitted).
84. Kennedy, supra note 1, at 11 & n.36 (citing Kennedy, supra note 21, at 207 n.162
(describing Hillsdale Foundry)).
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Unrestrained Scope of the Government Exemption
Not only is the governmental exemption unnecessary and based
on myth, the scope of the exemption is also unrestrained in its ap-
plication. This situation works to the advantage of the government
and the disadvantage of debtors. Although commentators have
made valiant efforts at grouping the cases to extract a common ra-
tionale and achieve some level of predictability, the general trend
has favored a broadening of the governmental exemption to the
stay to the detriment of debtors and contrary to the common law
doctrine of debtor protection. Several cases illustrate the current
confusion in the courts.
In Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. v. United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency,815 the company cited the pollution and
fraud passage8 to support its argument that Congress intended to
limit the section 362(b)(4) exception to "cases where the govern-
ment can show present ongoing pollution posing an imminent
threat."' The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
rejected this argument, holding that the police power was not lim-
ited to situations in which "'imminent and identifiable harm' to
the public health and safety or 'urgent public necessity' is shown"
and that the automatic stay did not apply to Environmental Pro-
tection Agency actions to enforce compliance with environmental
laws.8  In support of their unsuccessful argument, the appellants
cited the Supreme Court decision in Midlantic National Bank. 9
Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey Department of Envi-
ronmental Protection
In Midlantic National Bank, the Court considered a situation
analogous to the problem of the police power exemption. The ap-
pellant bankruptcy trustee sought to abandon a waste oil facility
85. 805 F.2d 1175 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3228 (1987).
86. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
87. 805 F.2d. at 1184 n.7.
88. Id. at 1184.




under section 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code,e° which permits a
trustee to "abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome
to the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the
estate." 91 The property was a burden because the debtor had dis-
posed of cancer-causing toxins at the site and was likely to be
charged with liability for the cleanup. Justice Powell, writing for
the majority in a five-to-four decision, determined that although
the Code did not include such language, a trustee's abandonment
power was limited by considerations of public health and safety.2
The Court rejected the argument that Congress's enactment to ex-
press exemptions to the automatic stay negated the existence of
any implied restrictions on the scope of the abandonment power.93
Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices
White and O'Connor, voiced a strong dissent. The dissent advo-
cated strict construction of the statute, suggesting that "when Con-
gress was so concerned it expressed itself clearly. '9 4 Justice Rehn-
quist admitted, however, that he would permit exceptions to the
abandonment power, but "far narrower" than those announced by
the majority, in situations in which "abandonment by the trustee
itself might create a genuine emergency that the trustee would be
uniquely able to guard against."95 As an example, the dissent sug-
gested that a trustee should not be permitted to abandon dynamite
sitting on a furnace in the basement of a schoolhouse.9
An exception that blends the Midlantic National Bank majority
and minority approaches would apply well in the automatic stay
situation. A judicial approach to police and regulatory power that
protects debtors as well as innocent schoolchildren, for example,
would render explicit exemptions, such as section 362(b)(4), en-
tirely unnecessary.97 Such was the analysis prior to the 1978 Act,
90. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (Supp. III 1985).
91. Id.
92. Midlantic Nat'l Bank, 474 U.S. at 507. "This exception to the abandonment power
vested in the trustee by § 554 is a narrow one.... The abandonment power is not to be
fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated to protect the public health or
safety from imminent and identifiable harm." Id. at 507 n.9.
93. Id. at 506.
94. Id. at 509 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
95. Id. at 515.
96. Id.
97. See Loo, supra note 73.
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when courts were not bound by the statutory exemptions to the
stay.98
The cases that follow the pollution rationale tend to fall into the
trap of the Hillsdale Foundry myth.9 The majority opinion in
Midlantic National Bank, for example, quoted the legislative
statement concerning the Texas and Montana cases to support the
proposition that the exemption is a blanket order by which states
may enforce all pollution laws against bankrupt parties. 00 As dis-
cussed earlier, the Court's interpretation of the pollution passage is
erroneous. The committee's reference to Hillsdale Foundry in its
report indicates that the legislators did not intend the exemption
to apply in all pollution cases.
Missouri v. United States Bankruptcy Court
Missouri v. United States Bankruptcy Court'0' is an example of
the cases in which some courts apply the Edwards and DeConcini
statements that the governmental exemption is "intended to be
given a narrow construction in order to permit governmental units
to pursue actions to protect the public health and safety and not to
protect a pecuniary interest."'1 2 Governmental proceedings fre-
quently are motivated by economic interests as well as health and
safety concerns. In each case analyzing such proceedings, courts
necessarily must determine whether the action brought by the gov-
ernment is predominantly for protection of a pecuniary interest or
for furtherance of public health, safety, or welfare. Commentators
refer to this approach as the pecuniary interest test.10 3 The test
generally consists of a two-part inquiry: whether a governmental
98. E.g., Hillsdale Foundry Co. v. Michigan (In re Hillsdale Foundry Co.), 2 Collier
Bankr. Cas. (MB) 542 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1974).
99. See supra notes 74-84 and accompanying text.
100. Midlantic Nat'l Bank, 474 U.S. at 504 n.6.
101. 647 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1162 (1982).
102. 124 CONG. REc. 32, 395 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards); id. at 33,995 (Statement
of Sen. DeConcini).
103. For discussions of the pecuniary interest approach, see Emerson, supra note 73; Loo,
supra note 73; Case Note, When Is a Governmental Unit's Action to Enforce Its Police or
Regulatory Power Exempt from the Automatic Stay Provisions of Section 362?., 9 FLA. ST.
U.L. REv. 369 (1981).
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unit is bringing the action and whether the action is an exercise of
governmental police or regulatory powers."'
In Missouri v. United States Bankruptcy Court, the state
sought a writ of prohibition to prevent the United States Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas from exercising
jurisdiction over a debtor's grain located in Missouri. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held that Missouri's
liquidation proceedings did not constitute state police or regula-
tory powers.10 5 The court of appeals examined both the House Re-
port and the floor statements in the legislative history of the 1978
Act and chose to rely on the latter, concluding that "Missouri's
grain laws, although regulatory in nature, primarily relate to the
protection of the pecuniary interest in the debtors' property and
not to matters of public safety and health."' 06 Since the Missouri
decision, a number of courts have chosen to follow the pecuniary
interest rationale.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York, for example, applied the pecuniary interest test in United
States v. Caro.10 7 In Caro the defendant, Raul Caro, was charged
with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute it. Raul and his
four brothers, who were sureties in the action, signed a $100,000
appearance bond. The defendant subsequently disappeared and
the government moved for an order entering judgment against the
sureties and appointing a receiver to sell the house pledged by one
of the sureties, Guillermo Caro. On December 20, 1984, the court
granted a show cause order against the sureties. Guillermo, how-
ever, filed a petition for bankruptcy on January 8, 1985, and
claimed that the automatic stay provision of section 362 prevented
the government from taking any action against his property. 0 8
The district court, in addressing whether the government's ac-
tion fell within the section 362(b)(4) exemption to the automatic
stay, applied the pecuniary interest test of Missouri v. United
104. 647 F.2d at 774-76.
105. Id. at 775.
106. Id. at 776.
107. 47 Bankr. 995 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
108. Id. at 995-96.
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States Bankruptcy Court.'09 The government claimed that its ac-
tion was exempt from the stay, arguing that its interest was in the
public welfare rather than in the bail money itself.10 Although the
court chose not to enter a final order and referred the matter to
the bankruptcy judge, it indicated a willingness to accept the gov-
ernment's argument."' Instead, the court should have required the
government to show that access to Guillermo Caro's property
would protect the public welfare by preventing the escaped de-
fendant, Raul, from distributing cocaine again. The absence of
such evidence suggests that the pecuniary interest test was misap-
plied. The test should permit governmental units to combat ex-
isting threats to the public welfare, but it should not permit reac-
tionary enforcement proceedings that are more punitive than
corrective in nature.
EEOC v. Rath Packing Co.
The government exemption is at its broadest when courts follow
the public policy test for determining whether a governmental ac-
tion is an exercise of police or regulatory power that is exempt
from the stay.1 2 According to the public policy approach, "where
the administrative agency is acting in a quasi-judicial capacity
seeking to adjudicate private rights rather than effectuate public
policy as defined by regulatory law the (b)(4) exception is inappli-
cable.""' 3 The central focus of the public policy approach is on
"whether the government seeks to effectuate a public policy inter-
est or to adjudicate private rights.""14
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ap-
plied the public policy analysis in EEOC v. Rath Packing Co." 5
109. "Whether the governmental action falls within [the 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4)-(5)] ex-
emptions depends on whether the government is protecting its pecuniary interest in the
property of the debtor, or its interest in the public health and safety." Id. at 996-97 (citing
Missouri v. United States Bankruptcy Court, 647 F.2d at 776).
110. Caro, 47 Bankr. at 997.
111. Id.
112. Herr v. Maine (In re Herr), 28 Bankr. 465, 468 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983).
113. Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Dan Hixson Chevrolet Co. (In re Dan Hixson Chevrolet
Co.), 12 Bankr. 917, 921 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1981).
114. Emerson, supra note 73, at 108 (citing In re Dan Hixson Chevrolet Co., 12 Bankr. at
921).
115. 787 F.2d 318 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 307 (1986).
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Rath was an Iowa corporation engaged in slaughtering hogs and
processing hog meat products. In 1977 the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) brought an action against Rath
based on a charge filed in 1975 by a woman who alleged that the
company had denied her employment because of her sex. The dis-
trict court held a trial on liability and referred the case to a special
master, who recommended, in addition to other relief, a class back
pay award of over $1 million. Rath subsequently filed a petition in
bankruptcy and the district court held that this petition did not
automatically stay the Title VII proceedings." On appeal to the
Eighth Circuit, Rath argued that the action brought by the EEOC
was stayed because it was directed at making aggrieved persons
financially whole-that it was enforcement of a money judgment,
rather than a governmental attempt to protect the public safety
and health.11 7
The court of appeals distinguished Rath from its prior decision,
Missouri v. United States Bankruptcy Court,' in which it had
applied the pecuniary interest test, and affirmed the district
court's ruling granting the EEOC an exemption to the automatic
stay." 9 The court examined the purposes underlying the laws that
the governmental units in these two cases sought to enforce and
determined that the purpose of the governmental action in Rath
was to "vindicate the public interest in preventing employment
discrimination."' 20 The court recalled that in Missouri v. United
States Bankruptcy Court, on the other hand, the law served to
protect a pecuniary interest in the debtor's property and therefore
was stayed. Had the court applied the same test to each situation,
however, the results might have differed. One could suggest that
the court chose to rely on the passage in the legislative history that
supported the desired result in each case. In Rath the court of ap-
peals was concerned with the outrage that a stay of an EEOC ac-
tion would cause-a likely result if the pecuniary interest test had
been applied.
116. Id. at 322-23.
117. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1982).
118. 647 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1981).
119. Rath, 787 F.2d at 323-25.
120. Id. at 325.
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An example of the government's broad exemption under the
public policy approach is the decision by the United States Court
of Appeals for the First Circuit in Cournoyer v. Town of Lin-
coln.121 Sometime between 1947 and 1952, Arthur Cournoyer and
his father began operating a truck salvage business on about
thirty-three acres of land in Lincoln, Rhode Island. In 1948, the
town passed a zoning ordinance restricting the use of the
Cournoyers' land to residential and farming. In 1962, a more re-
strictive zoning ordinance limited the use of the land to single fam-
ily residences with lots of not less than 20,000 square feet. For the
next twenty years the zoning board engaged the Cournoyers in a
sporadic battle to enforce compliance with the ordinance. The
Cournoyers, for the most part, continued their truck salvage
operation. 122
In 1982, Arthur Cournoyer filed a chapter 11 bankruptcy peti-
tion and continued to operate the business as a debtor in posses-
sion. The town attempted to clear the Cournoyers' land pursuant
to a Rhode Island Superior Court order. The Cournoyers then
sought an injunction from the bankruptcy court to prevent the
town from enforcing the zoning law against them.123 The bank-
ruptcy court held that the town was exempt from the automatic
stay, and the district court affirmed this ruling.'24
On appeal, the First Circuit applied the public policy test and
held that sections 362(b)(4) and (5) exempted the town's enforce-
ment of its zoning ordinance from the automatic stay provision.
The court considered the legislative history and pertinent case law
and determined that the town's enforcement of the zoning ordi-
nance was exempt from the automatic stay as a police or regula-
tory law. 2 5 The ironic result was that after twenty years of con-
ducting business in violation of the zoning ordinance, the
Cournoyers' bankruptcy, a safe harbor for debtors, made them
121. 790 F.2d 971 (1st Cir. 1986).
122. Id. at 972-73.
123. Id. at 972.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 977.
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more susceptible to the town's discretionary enforcement than
they had been prior to filing.126
CONCLUSION
The Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure were the first genuine at-
tempt to establish an automatic stay that could be applied in a
cohesive and consistent manner. The rules generally were success-
ful. Although they may have permitted occasional misapplication
of an automatic stay, they contained generous relief provisions.
When Congress enacted all-encompassing bankruptcy legislation in
1978, it should have codified the common law automatic stay as
modified by the Bankruptcy Rules of Procedure. Instead, the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978 included a specific exemption for govern-
mental police or regulatory actions. The exemption is unnecessary,
unfounded, and unrestrained; ultimately, it has eviscerated the
rule.
Without a clear policy statement from the legislature, the hands
of the courts are tied. The legislature must act to amend the stat-
ute either by removing the exemption and remanding the issue to
the courts or by providing an absolute definition for "police or reg-
ulatory power." Governmental units and the courts must have a
clear, workable, and effective standard for any exemption to the
automatic stay.
Robert E. Korroch
126. Two additional approaches are pertinent to the analysis discussed in this Note.
Under the agency expertise approach discussed by Emerson, the courts "in determining
whether an agency action would inordinately threaten the assets of the estate would gener-
ally show great defe[rence] to the governmental unit and afford extended 363(b)(4) protec-
tion [to the governmental claim]." Emerson, supra note 73, at 107. The second mode of
analysis would be a subject matter test. The case law indicates trends depending on subject
matter, such as a zoning, pollution, licensing, fraud, labor disputes, and securities regulation.
This second approach could be considered a corollary of the first, since most agencies spe-
cialize in particular areas of enforcement. See generally id. at 103-06.
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